Gulf Powers Seek New Security Partners Amid US-Iran Tensions

GULF STATES WEIGH SECURITY REALIGNMENT AS US COMMITMENT FACES SCRUTINY

Saudi Arabia’s new defense pact with Pakistan is the clearest signal yet that Gulf capitals are rethinking who underwrites their security. Across the Gulf Cooperation Council, the US-Iran conflict that erupted on February 28 has accelerated a strategic diversification that was already underway, with regional governments now actively cultivating alternative military and economic relationships rather than relying on Washington as the sole guarantor of their defense.

The financial and strategic logic behind this shift became harder to ignore once Iranian forces launched sustained attacks on military bases hosting US troops, civilian airports, energy facilities and hotels across multiple Gulf countries. The presence of American installations, far from deterring Tehran, appears to have made Gulf territories more exposed. Annelle Sheline, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, put it plainly to Al Jazeera: “The presence of the US military in Gulf countries had the opposite of a deterrent effect. These military bases became targets.”

Even after Washington and Tehran reached a memorandum of understanding to end the war earlier this month, Iranian forces continued launching missiles and drones at targets in Bahrain and Kuwait. The agreement has not fully stabilized the region. That persistent instability is now shaping procurement decisions and alliance structures across the GCC.

Beyond the Saudi-Pakistan pact, several GCC nations are deepening relationships with European defense suppliers, Russia and China. This approach predates the recent conflict but is likely to accelerate in its aftermath. Anna Jacobs Khalaf, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, framed the shift not as a break from Washington but as a recalibration. “The focus for countries like Saudi Arabia is the regional balance of power and pushing back on both Iran and Israel,” she told Al Jazeera. “This means diversifying partnerships and setting up platforms like the so-called quad group of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Egypt and Pakistan. It also means developing their own domestic defensive capabilities and developing more regional autonomy.”

Meanwhile, several GCC states are pursuing economic engagement with Iran despite the recent attacks, a counterintuitive strategy that some analysts regard as potentially more durable than weapons systems alone. Sheline argued that economic interdependence could reshape Iranian incentives more reliably than deterrence. “If Gulf and Iranian economic interests are intertwined, Tehran would think twice before striking the region,” she said. “Gulf states are likely to try a different approach, whereby they try to make it more costly for Iran to strike them in the future by tying themselves more closely to Iran, such as through electricity infrastructure.”

US Vice President JD Vance acknowledged this dynamic last week, noting that the United Arab Emirates, traditionally the most hawkish GCC member and the most aligned with Israel, is now engaging directly with Iranian officials including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. “The Emiratis are having conversations with the Iranians that have never happened before, including with the IRGC, about various types of economic incentives,” Vance said.

The broader US strategic posture compounds the uncertainty. Trump’s National Security Strategy, released last year, explicitly downgraded the Middle East’s geopolitical importance, arguing that American foreign policy resources should shift toward the Western Hemisphere. That repositioning creates room for Gulf states to build autonomous security arrangements, but it also raises legitimate questions about Washington’s long-term appetite for regional commitments.

Israel’s military operations add a further layer of complexity. Last year, Israeli forces bombed Doha, Qatar’s capital, in an operation targeting Hamas leaders during US-backed ceasefire negotiations. President Trump stated he was unhappy with the strikes and denied prior knowledge. Israel’s campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria have alarmed Gulf governments across the board, including those that have normalized relations with Tel Aviv. Jacobs Khalaf was direct about the scale of concern: “Israel’s destruction in Gaza since October 7, its entrenching and expanding occupation of Palestinian lands and its attacks on both Lebanon and Syrian territory are hugely threatening and unacceptable to all the Gulf states, even those that have normalised relations with Israel.”

The Trump administration has tried to balance its commitment to Israel against the broader regional settlement. Vance told Fox News that while the US and Israel share interests, “we also have some situations where our interests diverge.” Yet Washington has backed a separate Lebanon-Israel agreement that grants Israel considerable latitude for military operations until Hezbollah disarms, a position that sits uneasily alongside the Iran ceasefire’s call for comprehensive regional de-escalation.

The depth of the Gulf’s security realignment, and the investment flows and alliance structures it generates, will ultimately depend on whether the Iran ceasefire holds and whether Israel allows the diplomatic process to mature. Sheline identified the pressure point: “If the ceasefire deal leads to a comprehensive agreement with Iran, the US may finally be able to step away from the Middle East, but Israel may act as a spoiler to keep tensions going and pull the US back into fighting in the region.” Whether Washington has the leverage or the will to prevent that outcome remains the open question shaping every defense and economic calculation in the Gulf right now.