Iran's Regional Strikes Force Gulf States to Weigh Military Response Options

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps acknowledged on Monday that it had struck targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan, claiming to have hit US military facilities and assets across all four countries. The admission marks a sharp escalation in Tehran’s regional campaign and has forced Gulf governments into an uncomfortable strategic calculation: how much pressure to absorb before responding.

Ahmed Alkhuzaie, Managing Partner at Washington-based Khuzaie Associates LLC, told The Jerusalem Post that the likelihood of “limited strikes” against Iran has increased. A Bahraini analyst by background, Alkhuzaie characterized the situation as one of mounting pressure. “While outright offensive operations are not their default posture, the possibility of limited strikes, heightened maritime patrols, or covert actions cannot be ruled out if provocations continue,” he said.

The context matters. Iran’s attacks follow its failure to enforce control over the Strait of Hormuz through vessel seizures and diplomatic pressure, and they came after its Memorandum of Understanding with Washington effectively collapsed, removing a key constraint on Tehran’s behavior. Gulf governments now face a threat environment that has materially worsened in a short period.

The strategic imperative, as Alkhuzaie framed it, is calibration. “The strategic imperative for these states is to balance deterrence with stability, ensuring that Iran understands the costs of continued aggression.” That language points toward graduated responses rather than comprehensive military campaigns.

The Peninsula Shield Force, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s joint military apparatus, would likely serve as the primary instrument for any coordinated action. Alkhuzaie noted that the force “represents not only shared military capacity but also political solidarity among Gulf states” and has been modernized with ground troops, air support, and naval operations. Smaller Gulf states can amplify their influence considerably through that collective framework.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also possess independent capabilities that would allow them to adopt what Alkhuzaie called a “collective deterrent posture.” Kuwait maintains a capable defensive force despite its traditionally cautious foreign policy. Oman’s geographic proximity to the Strait of Hormuz and Bahrain’s role hosting the US Fifth Fleet add further strategic weight. As Alkhuzaie put it, “Together, these nations form a layered security network that extends beyond sheer military might. Their collective geography, commanding chokepoints, coastlines, and airspace, adds strategic weight to any potential response.”

Meanwhile, a recent incident illustrated how proxy actions can substitute for direct engagement. Yemen’s defense ministry admitted that its forces targeted a runway at the Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian plane from landing, though initial reports incorrectly attributed the strike to Saudi Arabia. The episode shows how states can signal resolve while avoiding the political costs of overt military action.

When asked whether targeting Iranian proxies could provide a sufficient response without escalating further, Alkhuzaie indicated Gulf states were “heading that way.” He was blunt about the economic dimension: “Our economies suffered enough… we can’t keep getting hit forever.”

By contrast, a second analyst offered a more cautious read. Mojtaba Dehghani, an Iranian analyst on Middle Eastern affairs, told The Jerusalem Post that Gulf states would likely tolerate Iranian attacks more than their public statements suggest. Their priority, he argued, is “preserving stability, investment confidence and the image that the Persian Gulf is still relatively insulated from a wider war.” Direct military action by Gulf states themselves remains unlikely in his assessment, with more probable outcomes involving indirect responses coordinated with the US, including enhanced air defense integration, intelligence sharing, and maritime security cooperation.

Dehghani outlined a higher threshold for direct Gulf action: “large-scale casualties on Persian Gulf soil, a major hit on Saudi or Emirati energy infrastructure, a prolonged closure of Hormuz, or a clear sense that US deterrence is no longer working.” Short of those triggers, he suggested Gulf capitals would allow Washington to bear the visible military burden while quietly strengthening their own defenses.

The tension at the heart of Gulf decision-making is structural. These governments need protection from Iranian threats but recognize that visible alignment with a harder US-Israel security posture could invite greater Iranian retaliation. Whether Tehran’s next move crosses one of Dehghani’s stated thresholds, or whether Gulf states act before it does, is the question that now hangs over the region.

For more analysis on the regional security dynamics, see https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-902368.