Saudi Arabia's Houthi problem is a balance sheet crisis, and it is courting the UAE to fix

Saudi Arabia’s outreach to the UAE this week comes down to a balance sheet problem: the kingdom’s Red Sea oil export corridor, its primary revenue artery, sits exposed to a Houthi offensive that has already put drone strikes over Riyadh. Washington rebuffed a Saudi request for military assistance earlier this month. Defence pacts with Turkey and Pakistan haven’t activated. That leaves Riyadh turning to its wealthiest regional partner for operational and financial backing in Yemen.

The visible marker of that pivot came Tuesday, when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted UAE Vice President Mansour bin Zayed in Riyadh, the kingdom’s most prominent reconciliation gesture after years of friction over Yemen, Sudan and Somaliland. Mansour, brother of UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, was met at the airport by Khaled bin Salman, the crown prince’s brother, whom Middle East Eye reported was assigned in February to repair the relationship.

Western and Arab officials told MEE that Yemen cooperation talks between the two states have run for months, slowly. Abu Dhabi wanted a public signal, plus concessions to its allies on the ground, before committing further. In July, Riyadh released only a casual photo of Mansour with Defence Minister Khaled bin Salman, no location, no timing disclosed. What changed the calculus: the Houthis’ lightning September offensive down the Red Sea coast, which experts say forced the fuller meeting.

The commercial follow-through arrived fast. After Mansour’s visit, the UAE sent two Boeing planes carrying officials to Riyadh to coordinate on Yemen, according to two Western officials familiar with the matter. Joshua Yaphe, senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest and former lead Arabian Gulf analyst at the State Department’s intelligence bureau, framed the Emirati position bluntly. “Yemen is going downhill fast, and everybody knows it. The Emiratis know the Saudis are in a worrisome position and they don’t want to see the Saudis flat-out fail, so they are coming in on a white horse, saying, ‘we can help you, if you are nice to us’,” he told MEE.

The coalition’s economics trace back to 2015, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined forces against the Iran-armed Houthis after they seized Sanaa and the northeast. The UAE put ground forces into the fight and trained factions widely regarded as the coalition’s most effective. By 2017, UAE-backed forces had pushed the Houthis off the Red Sea coast and defended Aden. “The UAE was the most effective part of the military coalition,” Kristian Ulrichsen, a Gulf expert and fellow at the Baker Institute, told MEE.

That partnership fractured over money and territorial influence. The UAE backed the Southern Transitional Council, which wants an independent southern state, a position that put Abu Dhabi at odds with Riyadh’s own interests. In December 2025, Saudi Arabia bombed UAE weapons shipments to the STC and launched an offensive against the group after it swept across the south. The UAE withdrew. The STC disbanded in January. One regional diplomat told MEE the UAE has since asked Saudi Arabia to open political space for the group, and has also pushed Riyadh to ban Islah, Yemen’s main Sunni Islamist party and part of the internationally recognized government, while lobbying Washington to designate it a terrorist organization.

Yaphe doubts Abu Dhabi gets the full return it wants. “The Emirates are not going to get what they want from the Saudis: a disavowal of Islah and an acceptance of the STC,” he said, though Riyadh might push Yemen’s government toward closer STC cooperation in a cabinet reshuffle. He also questioned whether renewed investment pays off militarily: “The bigger question is, even if the Emiratis put a ton of support behind the Yemeni government, can that turn the tide of the war? In the past, they were able to salvage things, but what’s their capacity now?”

The UAE’s leverage sits in its network of Yemeni clients: the STC’s Security Belt Forces, the Giants Brigade, and the National Resistance Forces, commanded by Tarik Saleh (nephew of Yemen’s former president), who briefly aligned with the Houthis before they killed him. The NRF once held Yemen’s southern Red Sea coastline before the Houthis retook it. Despite its formal withdrawal, experts say the UAE retains real influence over these forces, plus experienced Emirati officers and special-forces personnel who commanded troops against the Houthis a decade ago.

Ulrichsen reads the Riyadh meeting as strategic positioning. “This meeting was all about Yemen. The Saudis are preparing to make a significant move against the Houthis and want to make sure the anti-Houthi coalition is not as fragmented as it’s been,” he told MEE. The UAE, he added, can contribute significantly without redeploying troops, simply by leaning on the STC and Tarik Saleh.

Meanwhile, the security costs keep mounting. Saudi Arabia has struck the Houthis while absorbing drone and missile fire in return. Riyadh airport was bombed earlier this month; the East-West Pipeline was temporarily knocked offline by an attack Riyadh attributes to Iraq, where Shia militias coordinate with the Houthis. A former US official told MEE that Saudi Arabia could request Emirati help on air defence, and that reconciliation might unlock more cooperation from the Trump administration, which has pushed for the Gulf rift to close, and even deeper coordination with Israel, which deployed an Iron Dome battery in the UAE during its own fighting with Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the UAE on Sunday.

Other ledgers remain unresolved. Saudi Arabia condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in January; the UAE owns a commercial port in Berbera and runs a military base there. The two also back opposing sides in Sudan’s civil war, and on Tuesday Mohammed bin Salman held a call with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the military Riyadh backs against the UAE-supported Rapid Support Forces. Analysts expect the UAE to seek concessions on both Sudan and Somaliland as the price of Yemen cooperation.