United Arab Emirates
$24 Billion Saudi Fighter Jet Deal Poses China Espionage Risk, U.S. Intel Warns
Tech & AI Future

$24 Billion Saudi Fighter Jet Deal Poses China Espionage Risk, U.S. Intel Warns

Intelligence agencies flag espionage risks tied to Saudi Arabia's deepening military ties with Beijing.

A proposed $24 billion sale of 48 F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia is drawing scrutiny not just on Capitol Hill but inside the U.S. intelligence community, where analysts have flagged specific risks that Beijing could gain access to some of the most sensitive avionics in the American arsenal.

The Defense Intelligence Agency and other internal evaluations have identified two primary vulnerabilities. The first is the possibility of Chinese espionage operations conducted within Saudi territory. The second is the kingdom’s established and deepening military relationship with Beijing, which creates overlapping access points that intelligence officials view as potential vectors for technology transfer, including the F-35’s advanced radar and surveillance systems.

Saudi Arabia’s existing defense infrastructure sits at the center of the concern. The kingdom operates Chinese military bases and has integrated equipment from Chinese telecommunications firms Huawei and ZTE into its broader infrastructure, including facilities where sensitive F-35 technology would be housed. Intelligence analysts questioned whether U.S. and Saudi authorities could reliably secure the aircraft’s systems against infiltration, or whether Riyadh would meaningfully restrict contact between its personnel and Chinese military and intelligence entities.

The scope of Sino-Saudi military cooperation extends well beyond telecommunications. Saudi Arabia purchases ballistic missiles from China and is receiving direct assistance from Chinese military specialists in developing domestic missile production capacity. That relationship, analysts argue, creates the kind of institutional familiarity that makes technology transfer harder to detect and contain.

Meanwhile, the deal’s political path is growing complicated. The State Department submitted the proposed package, covering 48 F-35s and a spare engine, to two congressional committees in June for informal approval. The submission triggered immediate pushback from some lawmakers and congressional aides briefed on the intelligence concerns. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has signaled willingness to bypass the standard congressional approval process if legislative leaders do not endorse the sale, citing precedent from his use of emergency authority to accelerate arms shipments to Israel.

The sale was announced in November, when President Donald Trump hosted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House, a day after publicly committing to the F-35 transfer. The crown prince has long pursued the aircraft as part of a broader military modernization strategy. Saudi Arabia remains the single largest purchaser of American weapons and defense equipment, a position reflecting decades of military partnership between the two nations.

This is not the first time U.S. intelligence has raised China-related concerns about F-35 sales in the region. During Trump’s first term, similar assessments surfaced after he agreed in 2020 to sell F-35s to the United Arab Emirates as part of its normalization agreement with Israel. The Biden administration reviewed that planned sale as intelligence agencies documented expanding military, intelligence, and technology ties between the UAE and China. U.S. officials ultimately terminated that sales process entirely.

Israeli officials have also expressed reservations about the Saudi sale. Israel currently operates as the only Middle Eastern nation with operational F-35s and has deployed the aircraft in strikes against Iran. U.S. policy since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war has required classified reviews of major arms sales to Arab states to preserve Israel’s congressionally mandated qualitative military edge (a requirement that adds another layer of review to an already contested approval process).

The State Department, Pentagon, and Saudi Embassy in Washington declined to comment on the intelligence assessment. The White House and Chinese Embassy did not respond to requests for comment from The New York Times. Whether Rubio moves to invoke emergency authority, and how congressional leaders respond, will determine whether the $24 billion deal advances or follows the UAE sale into cancellation.

Q&A

What specific vulnerabilities has U.S. intelligence identified regarding the Saudi F-35 sale?

The Defense Intelligence Agency identified two primary vulnerabilities: the possibility of Chinese espionage operations conducted within Saudi territory, and the kingdom's established and deepening military relationship with Beijing, which creates overlapping access points for technology transfer including the F-35's advanced radar and surveillance systems.

How has Saudi Arabia integrated Chinese technology into its defense infrastructure?

Saudi Arabia operates Chinese military bases and has integrated equipment from Chinese telecommunications firms Huawei and ZTE into its broader infrastructure, including facilities where sensitive F-35 technology would be housed. The kingdom also purchases ballistic missiles from China and receives direct assistance from Chinese military specialists in developing domestic missile production capacity.

What is Secretary of State Marco Rubio's position on the congressional approval process for this sale?

Rubio has signaled willingness to bypass the standard congressional approval process if legislative leaders do not endorse the sale, citing precedent from his use of emergency authority to accelerate arms shipments to Israel.

What happened to a similar F-35 sale to the United Arab Emirates?

During the Biden administration, U.S. officials reviewed a planned $23 billion F-35 sale to the UAE after intelligence agencies documented expanding military, intelligence, and technology ties between the UAE and China. U.S. officials ultimately terminated that sales process entirely.