UAE Money Holds the Key to Yemen's Next Chapter

Abu Dhabi’s checkbook may decide Yemen’s next chapter. The economics of the war now hinge on one unresolved question: whether the United Arab Emirates will resume funding and shaping anti-Houthi forces in the country’s south. April Longley Alley, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute whose research focuses on Yemen and the Gulf, argues that a Saudi-Emirati reconciliation, one that restored Abu Dhabi’s financing and its leverage over allied Yemeni factions, could prove decisive for a coalition that has struggled to convert spending into battlefield results.

The returns on Riyadh’s investment so far have been mixed. Saudi Arabia’s escalating war against the Iran-backed Houthis has entered one of its deadliest chapters since the conflict began more than a decade ago. The Houthis made major territorial gains along the Red Sea coast in a blistering offensive last month, and attacks on Saudi territory have risen sharply in recent weeks. A strike on Oct. 10 on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed at least 13 people and injured more than 300.

Beyond the border, the balance sheet is just as troubling. Saudi Arabia has failed to convince international partners to join the fight or offer support beyond defensive assistance, with powerful allies such as the United States refusing to intervene. The Saudi-backed coalition on the ground has had uneven success, and analysts point to a core structural weakness: a lack of cohesion among anti-Houthi forces in southern Yemen, tied directly to the rift between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Alley said a Saudi-Emirati reconciliation that leveraged the UAE’s military effectiveness and its influence over anti-Houthi factions could be a gamechanger. “It’s the most important thing that could happen to change the course of the battle on the ground,” she said. But it would also be a “complicated challenge to reconcile,” given the “bitterness” between the two capitals over Yemen, tensions over Sudan, and “wider regional competition.”

The origins of that split lie in the war itself. The conflict began in 2014, when the Houthis seized the capital, Sanaa, and overthrew the government. A Saudi-led coalition of Gulf countries, including the UAE, intervened to restore it. But the partners’ regional ambitions drove a wedge between them, and tensions reached a boiling point last December: Saudi Arabia bombed a UAE arms shipment to Yemen as Riyadh moved to reverse advances by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group with long-standing ties to Abu Dhabi. The UAE then withdrew its forces from Yemen.

The operational vacuum left behind has been costly. “Since Abu Dhabi left, there was a huge vacuum of deterrence against the Houthis and managing the situation, especially regarding the operational capabilities on the ground,” said Amr al-Bidh, a top STC official. Bidh described the UAE as a “very efficient ally,” citing years of joint work on counterterrorism, fighting the Houthis, managing southern areas, and humanitarian programs. Riyadh subsequently took over restructuring anti-Houthi forces and has struggled to fill the void and unify rival militias.

Meanwhile, there have been signs of a thaw. Following recent discussions, the UAE has reportedly agreed to resume funding for forces in southern Yemen. The latest known talks occurred on Oct. 18, when Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman met UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi. Details of what has been agreed remain hazy. The UAE’s Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment, and the Saudi ambassador in Washington also did not respond.

What form Emirati involvement takes matters as much as whether it comes. “Is it just financing as we’ve heard, or something more?” Bidh asked, adding that direct involvement would “definitely help” politically and militarily in certain aspects. Alley said more effective command-and-control over local groups is needed to turn the tide on the ground, and the UAE’s experience working with local forces and its surviving networks make it essential in that role.

Political questions complicate the ledger. The UAE would want the demands of southern separatists represented clearly in any political settlement, Alley said, and Abu Dhabi also has concerns about the future role of groups associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the Islah party. The STC, which has pushed for an independent south along pre-1990 borders, has a fraught relationship with the Saudi-backed government and has signaled it will not fight beyond the old southern borders until Riyadh agrees to an independence referendum. Saudi Arabia, which wants a united Yemen, has opposed that aim.

As things stand, Riyadh does not appear willing to make a grand compromise to bring the UAE back. “It doesn’t seem like they’re there yet,” Alley said. But with the situation changing rapidly on the ground, the Saudi government may feel compelled to rethink its position. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, for its part, welcomes broader participation. “We welcome every step to have a united position in the region,” said Ambassador Marwan Ali Noman, political advisor to Yemeni Foreign Minister Afrah al-Zouba, noting that Abu Dhabi itself was attacked by the Houthis in 2022. “The Houthi threat is a threat to everyone,” he said, though he added he was not aware of the talks between the Saudis and the Emiratis.

Whether the funding resumes in time to alter the battlefield math, and at what political price, remains the question investors in this war, both in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, have yet to answer.