Gulf States Pivot Away From Israel Alliance as Iran's Military Reach Reshapes Regional Eco

Gulf states are recalculating their Iran strategy, and the math is increasingly unfavorable for the Abraham Accords.

The Iranian regime’s survival of this year’s conflict, and its demonstrated capacity to strike regional economic chokepoints, has fundamentally altered calculations across the Gulf. Key states are moving toward accommodation with Tehran rather than confrontation, a shift that carries profound implications for the Abraham Accords framework and the military partnership between the United Arab Emirates and Israel.

The war exposed vulnerabilities in Gulf state defenses and raised serious questions about the reliability of American military protection. Between late February and early April, when a ceasefire took hold, Iran fired approximately 550 ballistic and cruise missiles along with more than 2,200 drones at military and civilian targets across the region. The UAE absorbed the heaviest bombardment of any Gulf nation, making it the most-targeted country in the conflict, according to Emirati figures. That barrage prompted Abu Dhabi to deepen security cooperation with Israel, including the deployment of an Iron Dome anti-missile battery and intelligence-sharing arrangements.

Yet the same attacks that demonstrated the value of Israeli military assets also convinced Gulf capitals that coexistence with Iran is unavoidable. Senior Emirati national security officials met with their Iranian counterparts in Tehran this month, marking the first such engagement since the conflict began. The shift reflects a broader recognition among Gulf monarchies that Washington’s decision to pursue a diplomatic off-ramp with Iran intact means they must manage the relationship themselves.

Joshua Krasna, director of the Forum for Regional Cooperation at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center, characterized the Emirati calculation plainly: “They don’t have to like the Iranians, but they have to live with them.” That imperative clashes with Israel’s continued focus on Iran as a strategic threat, creating divergent postwar priorities between Jerusalem and Gulf capitals.

The divergence extends to economic concerns. Energy security and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz dominate Gulf thinking, not ideological opposition to the Iranian regime. Simon Henderson, director of the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at The Washington Institute, underscored the point: “Energy for the Gulf states and for President Donald Trump and frankly for the rest of the world is the single most important aspect of this crisis.”

That reorientation has already strained the Abraham Accords architecture. The framework, signed by Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain in 2020, rested partly on Gulf confidence in American military staying power. Former Israeli ambassador to the US Michael Oren warned that erosion of that confidence threatens the entire structure. “The cement of the Abraham Accords was the belief in the staying power of American force. And that’s not happening,” he said, adding that “there’s a greater possibility that Gulf states will start gravitating toward Tehran now.”

Meanwhile, the UAE-Israel relationship itself has grown more complicated. While military cooperation is likely to continue, Abu Dhabi has become reluctant to display the partnership publicly. The tension surfaced when Netanyahu visited the UAE during the war. Israeli media leaked the trip, the prime minister confirmed it publicly, and Emirati officials denied the visit had occurred. The episode damaged personal relations between the two leaders and illustrated the cost to Abu Dhabi of being perceived as too close to Jerusalem.

Political friction predates the Iran conflict. Under Netanyahu’s right-wing government, which returned to power in late 2022, Emirati officials grew unsettled by Israeli rhetoric and actions regarding the Temple Mount, the West Bank, and statements from far-right ministers including National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir. The previous Israeli government, led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, had displayed ties with the UAE more openly.

Yoel Guzansky, head of the Gulf Research Field at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, noted that many Emiratis blame Israel for making the UAE a target. “They say: You brought this disaster upon us,” he observed, explaining that the relationship with Israel itself triggered Iranian retaliation.

The extent of UAE offensive involvement in the conflict remains unclear. Abu Dhabi publicly denied striking Iran or allowing its territory to be used for attacks, but reports confirmed to The Times of Israel by an Arab diplomat indicate the UAE carried out some operations against Iranian targets.

Palestinian issues continue to create distance between the sides, particularly regarding Gaza reconstruction, to which the UAE is among the largest aid donors. Guzansky predicted that once international attention shifts back to Gaza, “the gaps will suddenly resurface.”

Most Emirati officials continue to support the normalization framework but harbor serious reservations about the current Israeli government. Gulf capitals are watching Israeli elections closely, hoping a different administration will prove more discreet, consultative, and attentive to Emirati interests.

An Israeli official recently told AFP that cooperation will deepen across multiple sectors, including a planned trade corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe. Two Israeli delegations were scheduled to visit the UAE this month, including a transportation ministry team. Those initiatives, however promising on paper, cannot overcome the fundamental tension: the UAE must manage Iran for the long term, while Israel remains focused on containing it as a strategic threat. Whether the Accords can survive that divergence, or simply become a framework for selective cooperation, is the question Gulf and Israeli officials have yet to answer.